This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the resource availability of other agents (that is, externalities) in a social cloud network, a special case of endogenous sharing economy networks. Specifically, we study how the closeness between agents and the network size affect externalities.
Backup 1 and CrashPlan 2 , which are examples of such social clouds, where two agents share or trade resources directly with each other, without an intermediary third-party. On the other hand, we have traditional cloud service providers like Amazon's AWS S3 3 and Microsoft's Azure 4 , which are examples of players in a horizontal market where different cloud providers compete for customer requests of computational resources.
Social Cloud Model
A social cloud g is a storage or computational resource sharing network of N agents connected by L links, that evolves endogenously when agents build their resource sharing connections. According to Chard et al. (2012) , agents could limit resource sharing with friends who are close to them. Mane, Ahuja, and Krishnamurthy (2014) capture this closeness by using the harmonic centrality measure (Boldi and Vigna 2014) , as
where d ij (g) is the distance between agents i and j, that is, the length of any shortest path between them.
Similar to Mane, Ahuja, and Krishnamurthy (2014) , we define the probability that agent i obtains a resource from j as
The probability that agent i will get the resource from at least one agent in the network g is
Based on the definition of externalities by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , we define the following for the social cloud model.
Definition 2.1. Suppose g is a social cloud, with distinct agents i, j, k such that jk / ∈ g. If j and k add a link, the resulting network denoted by g + jk , then i experiences (1) no externalities if γ i (g + jk ) = γ i (g), (2) negative externalities if γ i (g + jk ) < γ i (g), and (3) positive externalities if γ i (g + jk ) > γ i (g).
Our objective is to investigate the impact of a newly added link jk in g on the relation between changes in (1) Φ i and γ i , (2) N , d jk and γ i , for all i ∈ g.
Findings

Externalities and Closeness
On first glance, it seems that the harmonic centrality would lead to only negative externalities. However, a careful analysis reveals that both positive and negative externalities are exhibited. This is an important motivation of our study. Consider the network g (Figure 1(a) ). On adding link jk , we get g + jk (Figure 1 provides a basis for the study of externalities. As shown in Table 1 , the link jk is advantageous for agents f and g (shown in blue), and for j and k themselves, but disadvantageous for the remaining agents (shown in red). Observation 1. Addition of a link ( jk , above) results in the same closeness for some agents (for example, h and i) and an increased closeness for the others (for example, b and c). Addition of a link cannot decrease the closeness of any agent, and always increases the closeness of the agents who add the link (j and k).
Conjecture 1. For an agent to experience positive externalities, an increment in its closeness is necessary.
Finding 1. For an agent to experience positive externalities, an increment in its closeness is not a sufficient condition. For example, although the closeness of agents b and c increases, their chance of obtaining a resource does not improve.
Network Size Analysis
For our second objective, we focus on the ring network with sizes varying from 4 to 30 agents, considered reasonably large in the literature on experimental research on economic networks (Choi, Gallo, and Kariv 2016) . Very large networks may encode a very limited amount of information (Chandrasekhar 2016) . We focus on the ring network as its harmonic centrality is uniform. This helps us investigate the relation between externalities and network size.
To obtain data, we adopt a single computer program-based simulation (Naylor, Burdick, and Sasser 1967; Friedman and Cassar 2004) method due to unavailability of data of real world networks like BuddyBackup or CrashPlan, and because of the endogeneity issue (Choi, Gallo, and Kariv 2016) faced by various studies.
We, initially, compute γ i (g) for all agents in a ring network g. Then, we select an agent j arbitrarily and add a link with another agent k whose distance is two hops from j. We compute γ i (g + jk ) − γ i (g), and count the number of beneficiaries (NOB) i for whom this difference is positive. We repeat the above for all agents k who are located at distance two hops from agent j in g. Then, we increment the distance between j and k by one and follow the same procedure. We do this until we exhaust all agents j. Figure 2 summarises our results. The x-axis represents the shortest distance between two agents involved in link formation. The y-axis represents the NOB. The z-axis represents the network size (the number of agents in the network).
Finding 2. In "less" populated ring networks, no agent experiences positive externalities.
In networks with size varying from 4 to 10 (Figure 2(a) ), no agent experiences positive externalities. From Conjecture 1, positive externalities require an increase in closeness, which is absent here. However, from network size 11 to 30 ( Figures 2(b) and 2(c)), a significant number of agents experience positive externalities.
Finding 3. In ring networks of size greater than 10, as the distance between the agents involved in link addition increases, the number of beneficiaries increases in most cases, and in all cases for small distances. Figures 2(b) , 2(c) and 2(d) are of this type. It is clear that, if an agent experiences positive externalities, its closeness should increased (from Conjecture 1). This is intuitive -if a pair of agents who are far from each other in g form a link then, this link reduces the mutual distances among other agents, and therefore, their closeness increase. As discussed in Finding 1, an increase in closeness is not a sufficient condition for positive externalities. We believe that an increase in closeness together with some conditions will always imply positive externalities, and leave open this question of finding the other conditions of sufficiency.
Plots in
Finding 4. In ring networks, the number of beneficiaries is always less than the In all our experiments, the percentage of beneficiaries varies from 0% to 26% of the total number of agents in the network.
Conclusion
Though our investigations are on a small scale, our findings have many applications and implications. Our study enhances our understanding of externalities in the sharing economy network model. Our findings show that network size is also a key factor in determining externalities.
Our approach of relating externalities and group well-being (that is, measuring the percentage of beneficiaries versus non-beneficiaries) enriches the transfer-based network formation model (where agents subsidise others to form or not to form a link with others), (Bloch and Jackson 2007) by incorporating group subsidisation. In particular, agents can subsidize a pair of agents involved in a link formation, instead of individual subsidization. For example, in some research and development settings, where a set of beneficiary-firms are willing to pay a pair of firms that would like to collaborate (Jackson 2008) . Using the approach and results discussed in the paper, one can model this situation either as collective subsidization or as bargaining on link formation. In this case, a set of non-beneficiary-firms will pay for the pair of firms to not collaborate with each other, or a set of beneficiary-firms will pay for the pair of firms to collaborate with each other. Alternatively, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries may bargain for link formation.
Our result regarding the network size and the distance between agents can be used to formulate resource allocation policy in social clouds. Specifically, the policy may include the use (or recommendation) of friends as backup partners, so as to avoid negative externalities or minimize the number of non-beneficiaries (for example, by choosing agents for data backup who are far away from the agent requesting backup). Although our results are for ring networks, they can be extended to other network structures too.
Existing literature has not looked at resource availability in social networks where links (connections) are endogenously formed. We believe that our study is a first step towards enhancing our understanding of externalities in social clouds, and hence in endogenous sharing economy networks.
